

THE SYMBOLIC POWER: NATIONAL SECURITY CULTURE REFLECTED IN PRIMARY AND PRE-PRIMARY EDUCATION

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Abstract: *The current paper approaches the potential of symbolic power reflected by the security culture, from a socio-anthropological perspective. In this regard, the deductive endeavors have been doubled by the transductive ones. The security culture, in its operationalized meaning used by the Guide of the National Defense Strategy for 2015-2019, is perceived as an activating factor in the extended national security functionality. The case study focuses on the rapport between the core of the security system and the education system, more precisely, on the manner in which the forming and development of security culture is or should be reflected by formal education, especially through curricula specific to primary or pre-primary levels. The methodological design encompasses the content analysis of documents related to security and curricula, aiming at identifying competence clusters or formative contents devised for this purpose.*

Keywords: *symbolic power; culture; security culture; security education; primary and pre-primary school curriculum.*

1. INTRODUCTION. THE SYMBOLIC POWER

The symbolic power, perceived as an expression of "dominance" (*Herrschaft*) in Max Weber's theory in the first part of his monumental work *Economy and Society* (1956/1978), functional in case of evident determination and influence of the dominator in relation with an influenced behavior of the dominated, has found its plenary manifestation in Pierre Bourdieu's studies (1991). Basically, in the French sociologist's acceptance, the symbolic power is a countermeasure to the material manifestation of power and it implies justifications, convictions, and types of classification and legitimization of power. This symbolic meaning of power with Bourdieu is in reference to the legitimating dimension of any impositions of power, be it political, economic, military or of any other nature, which creates, even in its latent state, a symbolic capital and a form of related violence, a struggle inside the symbolic space used for imposing meanings, labels, categories and other various types of legitimating a present or potential behavior. In other words, the symbolic power consists of everything that has been left behind after the reduction of power relations to communication

relations, irrespective of their institutional form or type of approach:

In criticizing all forms of the 'interactionist' error which consists in reducing relations of power to relations of communication, it is not enough to note that relations of communication are always, inseparably, power relations which, in form and content, depend on the material or symbolic power accumulated by the agents (or institutions) involved in these relations and which, like the gift or the potlatch, can enable symbolic power to accumulate. It is as structured and structuring instruments of communication and knowledge that 'symbolic systems' fulfill their political function, as instruments which help to ensure that one class dominates another (symbolic violence) by bringing their own distinctive power to bear on the relations of power which underlie them and thus by contributing, in Weber's terms, to the 'domestication of the dominated' (Bourdieu, 1991:167)

Pierre Bourdieu's symbolic power is to be found encompassed in the British sociologist Michael Mann's¹ phrases *ideological power* and

¹ In the first volume of his work entitled *The Sources of Social Power*, the British sociologist structures the rapports between diverse types of societies, in accordance with quaternary typology of powers:

diffuse power. However, the phrase itself, irrespective of the shape it takes, is (and remains) vague, incomplete, insufficiently developed. A redefinition (in analytical terms) of the power matrix in the social field, achieved by John B. Thompson in 1996, better clarifies the phrase: *symbolic power* „stems from the activity of producing, transmitting and receiving meaningful symbolic forms”. Thompson’s perception is by far more explicit, yet, also more different from the projection released by Bourdieu, who would place a symbolic potential behind any form of power manifesting in social areas, just like a shadow impossible to be detached. The shadow of symbolic power is projected as a legitimation necessity, once the light of knowledge overlaps with the power forms in rapport with the relating angle (ideological, in Michael Mann’s perspective). According to Thompson, symbolic power does not represent the remains of the power relations’ reduction to communication relations; on the contrary, it is intrinsic to any forms of communication, it goes hand in hand with information, through the symbolic content it implies. It is these very symbolic remains, apparently harmless, hard to control, that become the holder of unimaginable energies and it gives birth to latent symbolic powers. We can as well perceive the symbolic power as a shadow of the justifications to any possible other forms of power manifestation, still, we can identify it instant communication, within social networks, in everything else that interactionism could not explain in a satisfying manner for Bourdieu’s demands. Symbolic power does not stand for a holder of latent social energy, because social energy can be stocked in groups of individuals belonging to various species². Symbolic intelligence differentiates humans from the representatives of the other species, and the expansion of symbolic potential from individual level to the level of the small group or even of culture calls for bringing up manipulation of the huge energy potential of a culture, named symbolic power.

ideological, economic, military, and political (IEMP), v. Mann (1986/2003:2). John B. Thompson (1996:18) completes Michael Mann’s projection with Pierre Bourdieu’s and proposes a matrix of powers manifesting within the social area: economic, political, coercive, and symbolic.

² ”Should people’s symbolic intelligence seem unequalled by other species on Earth, social capacities are to be found with other species as well”, according to Hofstede *et al* (2012:444).

2. CULTURES PERCEIVED AS DEPOSITARIES OF SYMBOLIC POWER

Culture, understood as *mental software* or as a set of thinking, feeling and potential action typologies, “consists of unwritten rules of the social game” (Hofstede *et al.*, 2012:17). Mental programs differ from one another, in relation with the levels of culture, from national, regional, ethnic, religious and linguistic, of the generation or social class, up to the level of organization. The common aspects, whatever links cultures, not what separates them, is made up of a set of elements deposited in a pre-established order, following norms, patterns, charts, systems of values. These elements are the ones that compose the DNA of societies. It is not accidental that the Dutch researcher Geert Hofstede, in his great work, written together with his son, Gert Jan Hofstede and with the Bulgarian Michael Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations. Software of the Mind*, transductively approaches the cultural issue, inducing the idea of a “cultural genome” pre-existence and of a cultural continuity, based on it:

During a person’s life, new body cells continually replace old ones. The twenty-year-old does not retain a single cell of the newborn. In a restricted physical sense, therefore, one could say we exist only as a sequence of cell assemblies. Yet we exist as ourselves. This is because all these cells share the same genes.

At the level of societies, an analogous phenomenon occurs. Our societies have a remarkable capacity for conserving their distinctive culture through generations of successive members and despite varied and numerous forces of change. While change sweeps the surface, the deeper layers remain stable, and the culture rises from its ashes like a phoenix (Hofstede *et al.*, 2012:36).

“Cultural genome” is not a mere presupposition. A system of values, symbols, centripetal forces that takes action within nations maintains cultures to be able to transmit genetically their need for integration and joint reaction to threats. Geert Hofstede (2012:31) includes language, mass-media, education, national armed forces, political system, national representation in events with symbolic echo in the set of these cohesive forces. In other words, he places in the foreground those institutions that establish the symbolic power (let us remember, for example, the role played by the institution named language, in Pierre Bourdieu’s study, *Language*

and *Symbolic Power*), also suggesting other forms of power: military (coercive), political, economic, each of which has its attached symbolic shadow. Thus, cultures are not only depositaries of symbolic power; symbolic forms prefigure culture, they are “multipliers” within the cultural evolution process. Symbolic power models these forms that highlight the features of the whole (culture) and not of the parts (various particular forms of manifestation of culture). Ralph Linton, who perceived culture as the “total way of life of any society, not simply to those parts of this way which the society regards as higher or more desirable” (Linton, 1968:61), had prefigured the cultural continuum half a century ahead of Hofstede – the “genome”, metaphorically suggested by the Dutch scholar as being the reference element of the cultural “sharing”, to the detriment of the very culture, at a given moment. As a result, this cultural “genome”, prefigured and transmitted through the symbolic power, aims at a sharing by means of education/training or by explicit (the main agent of cultural transmission) or implicit imitation³. The “sharing”, in Linton’s anthropological projection, constitutes the activating element, the one that transforms the symbolic potential of a culture in explicit symbolic power.

3. SECURITY CULTURE

Should Mann’s phrase *ideological power* be inadequate, then the phrase *diffuse power* is indistinct, whereas Bourdieu’s term *symbolic power* is decentered; the farthest term ever from any possible operational form used to be, until recently, that of security culture. First, just like in case of language, the cohesive institution of a nation’s symbolic power, culture cannot function as *ergon* (explicit product), either. The complex rapport (of interconditioning) between the two terms was described by Eugeniu Coșeriu: language is, on the one side, the foundation of culture, on the other side, it is one of its forms⁴. Language and

culture produce effects in the field of products (linguistic, cultural); nevertheless, it cannot be shaped as such, into concrete products. Both institutions are autogenerative. Yet, speaking of a genus proximum (culture) impossible to project at the products’ tangible level of any other forms of power, or speaking of the impossibility to quantify explicitly this form of power, directly associated with (symbolic power), becomes unproductive in rapport with the specific difference (of security), apparently explicitly formulated, describing explicit products related to security. Placing together the two terms in the phrase *security culture* raised serious questions in the attempt of operationalizing the concept. First, the concept itself is the outcome of some recent institutional approach (of security structures), necessary to be debated to answer adequately a series of challenges at the level of *soft* powers (in the light of the American researcher Joseph Nye Jr.’s perspective, “Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others”, 2007:391), of the “attraction and seduction”, as well as at the level of *hard* power, illustrated through asymmetric actions of terrorist nature. Thus, the security culture constitutes in itself a diffuse term, considered to be a recent institutional approach that operates with a broad range of sensitive aspects of security, starting with emergencies and ending with the set of skills the people need, as citizens of one state (which means, from the perspective of their contracts with the state), in relation with the values, interests and immediate necessities of the state. However, due to the fact that in case of insufficiently explicit terms, before any possibility of operationalization, there is need for a transductive approach to be applied to the more explicit dimension, we are going to utilize a metaphor, belonging to the same class of organic metaphors, in order to be able to describe the security system.

The National Defense Strategy (NDS, 2015) is the first projective document that operates a clear distinction between core and extended forms of national security:

The Strategy reflects the need to promote an extensive **national security concept** – grounded on constitutional democracy and mutual respect between state and citizens – regarding interests related to ensuring national security in the following fields: defense (perceived in a double normative stance of national defense and collective defense),

³ It is the very contact with explicit culture of the society and the experience derived from this contact that recreates, in each individual, the share psychic moods which constitute the implicit culture.

⁴ “Language is, on the one side, the foundation of culture, of culture as a whole, and, on the other side, it is one of culture’s forms. This means that only language has this possibility of being language and reality at the same time and of speaking of itself. Music cannot speak about music, and neither can sculpture speak about sculpture. In conclusion, language has this feature of

being both the foundation of culture and one of culture’s forms” (Coșeriu, în Saramandu, 1996:102-103).

public order, intelligence, counterintelligence and security activity, education, healthcare, the economic field, the financial sector, environment and critical infrastructure (NDS, 2015:5).

It is not this distinction between the extended national security concept and the core security (implicit to this term) that matters but the distinction between corresponding security systems. Related to the core security, we can mention structures with explicit security tasks (defense, public order, intelligence), whereas the extended system comprises, apart from the already mentioned tasks, other systems with various tasks and, above of them, they are responsible for security (education, healthcare, environment and critical infrastructures). The analogy with the human body is close. For example, the skin is not only a sensory receptor of the human body; it represents the largest organ with a defending duty for the body. The skin's defending role consists mainly of preventing pathogenic agents from entering the body. In other words, we speak of an organ that has mainly a defending role, belonging to the category of core security organs and systems. The human body also has apparatuses, systems and organs with other key roles. For example, the liver, an organ that secretes bile, a substance with a fundamental role in digestion, plays, among other roles, the part of a defender against toxins, disinfects the intestines and protects against some digestive diseases. This organ belongs to the category of extended security organs and systems. Bearing a similar meaning, the symbolic power of a nation may be assimilated with the human body's metabolism, while the totality of defending and replicating processes of the "cultural genome" are easy to understand by analogy with the anabolic and catabolic processes of the human body.

The *security culture*, in this metaphorical approach to knowledge, has the role to foresee any possible form of perturbing a nation's metabolism, to protect it against any metabolic threats. Naturally, when speaking of the set of prevention measures taken to annihilate the dysfunctions at the level of explicit meaning, the *security culture* has still remained a diffuse, suggesting term and it has been perceived as an individual's set of information, convictions, attitudes and values (on which one can take action through the *symbolic power*) in relation with the state or with the state's systems, which generates various forms of power (political, economic, coercive) and implies citizens' education for the protection of national values. The specialized literature in Romania refers to the concept of *security culture*, in most of the cases, as a set of knowledge and information, not as a functional, metabolic, autopoietic and implicitly non-additive structure⁵.

The concept of *security culture* explicitly signals a break from the previous paradigms with regard to security, traditional approach to intelligence, which used to involve the understanding of security as military power (Sebe, 2013:48-49) and of the military art as "philosophy of warfare", a break from the Clausewitzian paradigm in the field of military sciences, from the action strategy to the detriment of deterrence strategies, from the prevalence of *hard* power in relation with *soft* powers. The concept was understood in the context of previous strategic visions (see the role of security culture in democratic context, in accordance with *The Strategic Vision 2011-2015*), Ciupercă, 2011:94). However, it was also developed within the normative or projective framework of administrative structures of the Romanian state, being given an operational definition starting with the year of 2015, through the *National Defense Strategy Guide for 2015-2019*⁶, whereas the




Fig.1 The extended national security system and security culture. Role of education

⁵ See the example given in the online publication *Intelligence in your service*: "The security culture may be defined as a set of knowledge and information in reference to the national security values and necessities, whose acquisition leads to the development and promotion of some conducts needed for self-defense or national defense against internal or external threats" (Calangea, 2017).

⁶ The Guide was drawn to promote the double meaning of security within the bipolar state-citizen, contributing to the consolidation of not only the term *security culture*, but also of its content: "From this perspective, the document is intended to be a first stage in developing this security culture, promoting the idea of

fundamental aspect of this projection is represented by the direct connection with the main vehicle used to transmit/promote culture – education:

Security culture: totality of values, norms, attitudes or actions that lead to the understanding and assimilation of the security concept and its connected forms (national security, international security, collective security, insecurity, security policy etc.) at society level. Security education is a preponderantly educational dimension, through the development of a preventing attitude at society level for self-, group and state defense and protection against risks, threats, vulnerabilities, real and potential aggressions (National Defence Strategy Guide for 2015-2019, 2015:7).

4. FROM THE DESIGN OF SECURITY EDUCATION TO THE NATIONAL EDUCATION SYSTEM. CASE STUDY: THE ROMANIAN PRIMARY AND PRE-PRIMARY EDUCATION

4.1 Method. State institutions play a fundamental role in designing the security education. The state can take the role of symbolic power depository and it can prefigure the set of probable and explicable reactions by means of various legitimation instruments of the forms of power that derive from its relation with the citizen. The state can appeal to ceremonies, heroes, symbols and myths to develop its security culture – its development, “also achieved through continuous education, able to promote values, norms, attitudes or actions that enhance the acquisition of the national security concept” (National Defense Strategy for 2015-2019, 2015:21) is one of action directions to challenges that Romania faces, in accordance with the national strategy - , but it also dispose of forming institutions. The only aspect that is worth mentioning is the one related to the projective optimum, in rapport with the age from which the learning of “security insurance” should start, at individual level, respectively, with the projective coherence in national curricular instruments. In this respect, we used a contents analysis, the research method consisting of a qualitative

establishing a civic partnership for the setting of high standards of collective and individual security – objective established through the National Defense Strategy.”, according to its display on the President’s official internet page, URL: <http://www.presidency.ro/ro/presa/securitate-nationala-si-aparare/ghidul-strategiei-nationale-de-aparare-a-tarii-pentru-perioada-2015-2019>

organization of national curricular contents specific for primary and pre-primary education, for the identification of certain relations with the projected variables by means of national strategic documents, or for the identification of some formative patterns. The research consisted of two stages: (1) identification of the role of educational dimension in the national defense strategy and the national defense strategy guide; (2) identification of competences/objectives clusters or formative content projected within curricular documents deriving from the strategy and its norms of implementation.

4.2 Results. Strategic documents include, on the one hand, a set of three directions of action in the field of education, including “shaping an ample national education project that can assure the mechanisms programs, projects and performance planning” (NDS, 2015:21), enhancing scientific research in correlation with the education system and the development of security culture through education or separately from it, on the other hand, ways of fostering the security culture, among which we should mention:

stimulation of institutions and people’s interest in security culture/ education, through mass-media and other ways of promotion; integration of security education within educational institutions, both destined to children and adolescents, and to adults, by organizing lectures, conferences, symposiums and workshops, meetings, talks, round tables and other leisure-educational activities (NDSG, 2015:14).

Moreover, the same National Defense Strategy Guide mentions the “the design of a real project of national reform in education”, respectively, specific actions/ steps/ methods/ ways of achieving at least two of the national strategic objectives (NSOs): NSO 18 “Deterrence of radical or extremist reactions and tendencies, by respect shown for pluralism in society and spread of tolerance at the level of civil society” (NDSG, 2015:34), respectively, NSO 19 “Promotion of national identity, also by preservation and employment of cultural and natural heritage, together with a responsible encouragement of areas of excellence”. If, in the first example, we detect the direction projected in the strategy transposed, with regard to the development of security culture by means of continuous education, two other aspects are worth mentioning, as they refer to the two objectives: “modeling the education system by including the concept of pluralism in it” (within

NSO 18), respectively, “developing educational instruments in the formal, non-formal and informal education, to promote spiritual identity in a climate of tolerance and multiculturalism” (within NSO 19).

National curricular documents for primary and pre-primary education, which can be referred in connection with those aspects projected within the national defense strategy, are, first of all, preceding the current strategy. For the pre-primary segment, the document in use is *Curriculum for the early education of children from birth through age 6/7* of 2008, while for the primary education segment, the document referring to the topic under debate include *School curriculum for the subject matter Personal Development. Preparatory grade, grade I and grade II*, of 2013, and *School curriculum for the subject matter Civic Education. Grades III and IV*, of 2014. The pre-primary segment has a curricular document initiated in 2017, which is to be piloted for the school year of 2018-2019 and applied later on (if the case is), entitled *Curriculum for Early Education (age 0-6)*, but its effects cannot be considered yet. Nevertheless, the contents of this curriculum and the accuracy of the formative dimension reflection in the field of national security can be analyzed.

The *Curriculum for Early Education* of 2008 is inadequate for the current national curricular requirements; its content is somehow anachronic in relation with the unprecedented development of high technologies and their outcomes in education, including early education, yet, it is based on a set of values and principles consistent with the general design of the national security system and with the use of instruments meant to activate the symbolic power: “non-discrimination and exclusion of social, cultural, economic and gender inequity”, together with avoidance of discriminatory phrases/prejudices and celebration of diversity (CEE, 2008:5). Structured on areas of development and containing a set of general/specific objectives for each area, the curriculum sends to the general frame of the strategic design: “the educational environment has to allow the harmonious development of a child and to highlight the intercultural dimension, together with the social inclusion”, prefiguring the action directions in reference to NSOs 18 and 19 of the Strategy’s Guide. With regard to contents, the area of socio-emotional development related to ages 3-6(7) includes, in its psycho-social development trait, General Objective 3 – “Development of the ability to recognize, appreciate and respect similarities and differences between people”, out of which

there derives, among others, Specific Objective 3.2 - “(The child) is able to formulate questions about others’ family, ethnicity, language, culture, physical traits” (CEE, 2008:48) and Specific Objective 4 – “Development of (a child’s) capacity to follow rules and understand their effects” (CEE, 2008:48). As far as the document of 2017 is regarded, it aims at the multilateral development of a child⁷, but it proposes only some changes in the nuance of contents, it changes the sequence of the development areas and replaces objectives with competences. Thus, related to the socio-emotional development, General Competence 2 was designed – “Development of pro-social conduct for accepting and respecting diversity”, with its Specific Competences 2.1 – “Recognition, appreciation and respect of similarities and differences between people” (with an example of conduct specific to ages 3-6: “Formulates questions about others’ family, ethnicity, language, culture, physical traits”, CEE, 2017:28, and 2.2 – “Understands and follows rules, understands the effects of rules”, CEE, 2017:29).

With regard to curricular documents specific to the primary education segment, even if they are adequate for the curricular requirements – drawn in accordance with the model for curricular design, centered on competences – aspects of security culture development framework are much vaguer that in case of pre-primary education. The school curriculum for the subject matter *Personal Development*, for the preparatory grade, grade I and grade II (2013) does not continue the development of previously projected competences, through the curriculum for pre-primary education, but it develops specific interaction competences, see General Competence 2 – “Adequate expression of feelings and interaction with unknown children and adults”, thus annihilating the previous achievements, whereas Specific Competence 2.3, for the preparatory grade: “exploration of characteristics of favorite beings and objects and of simple interaction with them”, for grade I: “exploration of necessary traits for becoming a good friend”, and for grade II: “exploration of abilities of interacting with the others” (SCPD, 2013:6). In conclusion, this curricular document does not achieve the passage from acquired competences throughout the pre-primary education to the ones necessary for the consolidation of

⁷ For a better preparation of a child, for school and life, during his/her early childhood, the attention given to all aspect of the child’s development is extremely important (CEE, 2017:5).

values, norms, attitudes and actions consonant with the state’s interests, which is, it does not facilitate the passage from group norms to national norms or to the implications of a civic contract.

The school curriculum for the subject matter *Civic Education*, for grades III and IV, aims explicitly at the “moral-civic accommodation of children” (SCCE, 2014:2) and their initiation in “adopting a moral-civic conduct in a democratic society – an active, free, responsible, tolerant, open, communicative, reflexive and self-assessing conduct” (PSEC, 2014:3). Illustrative for our study is the scrutiny of specific competences deriving from general competences 1 and 2, related to norms of conduct and moral-civic conduct:

Table1. General competences 1 and 2 of the School curriculum for the subject matter *Civic Education*, grades III and IV, *apud* SCCE (2014:5;7)

grade III	grade IV
GC 1 Application of conduct norms in everyday life	
SC 1.1 exploration of the status of person that every individual possesses	SC 1.1 recognition of belonging to a place (local, national, European) where the person is integrated
SC 1.2 identification of defining moral traits of a person	SC 1.2 identification of some relevant elements for belonging to various communities (local, national, European)
SC 1.3 exploration of small groups and of the rules of the group	SC 1.3 exploration of some moral norms that regulate relationships with other people
GC 2 Manifestation of some moral-civic conduct traits in life-contexts in a familiar environment	
- irrelevant, competences regarding the physical background	SC 2.1 exploration of some moral values that constitute the basis of relationships with other people
	SC 2.2 recognition of some moral-civic conducts in everyday life
	SC 2.3 distinction between pro-social conducts and antisocial conducts

The curriculum under debate proves that for the Romanian education system the design of a security culture framework starts only at the level of grade IV (ages 10-11), although the fundamentals of values, norms or attitudes or proactive actions forming related to national security are set starting with the pre-primary education.

4.3 Discussion. The most important observation in rapport with the correlation between the two types of projective documents in the field of national security and national education is that there are no competence/objectives clusters or designed formative contents in the curricular documents directly derived from strategy. The alignment of the two projective documents is rather random, their convergence resulting from remaining of formative contents in accordance with an acceptable minimum level of security culture. In the circumstances of the passage from collective values toward the individual ones, the Romanian state needs to compensate this reality through formative measures directly derived from the national defense strategy. Practically, the only document which could have been aligned with the strategy in use will only be enforced after the expiry of the strategy and it will include, in the pre-primary formative system, requirements of the security education derived from main goals of a conservatory education system, reflecting the previous directions and the drawbacks of the education system and not the explicit requirements for adequate development, imposed by the national defense strategy.

The formal alignment to the current curricular requirements does not benefit from an intercultural openness such as the case of the national curriculum should be, nor from an anticipative design of the formative system. For example, the connection with the mass-media (including the new media as well), brought about through means of facilitating the security culture development, continues to consolidate a parallel space from the education system. Although the technological determinism met consistent criticism and the technological dominance was debated by some of the most relevant contemporary anthropologists, the Romanian education still looks at technology and culture as if they were strictly subordinated to it: “This domination of technology on culture is yet an illusion. The software in cars might be globalized, but the software of the minds that use them cannot be” (Hofstede *et al.*, 2012:374). From this perspective, the answer of the education system (which is preserved) to the challenges of the state: the necessity to develop a security culture in a formal manner (but exceeding it), for the first time explicitly formulated in 2015, is doubled by the delayed answer of the state with regard to the education system: “In cultures where education is important, new technologies will be used for its benefit” (Hofstede *et al.*, 2012:451). Not even at

formal level was the security system able to impose its projective line. None of the actions/steps/ methods/ specific means of achievement of action directions related to the national defense strategy is to be found explicitly in a set of specific competences for primary and pre-primary education.

Logically, the state institutions should collaborate. The best example with regard to the symbolic power, in the history of the past century, is Israel, settled in 1948. Yet, this example is not random. Israeli citizens benefit from generous efforts of their state to accumulate a set of minimum knowledge, attitudes and values related to the concept of security culture. Even particular forms of the security culture, chronologically speaking, dating older than it, such as strategic culture⁸, find a proper climate of development within the formal, nonformal and informal education of Israel: national security subordinates national objectives and citizens' objectives due to its education system (Giles, 2009:99). But this model of good practice does not produce effects at the applicative level of the bipolar relation citizen-state when it comes about the security culture in Romania.

5. SECURITY CULTURE

The development of security culture asks for symbolic power awareness, both on behalf of the state and of its citizens. This latent symbolic power cannot be activated through formative plans inadequate to the current society's organization forms, current global openness or technological development. The Romanian state has inherited a special relation with its citizens since the years of communism. At that time, the maximum logical extension of the *internal group*, the generalized "we" used to include the nation, at its best. The state was considered a different structure, the first step toward the meaning of *external group*. The state was referred as "they". The thinking pattern

⁸ Gregory F. Giles (2009:97) utilizes the following definition of strategic culture: „Shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behaviour derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives”. The first definition of the concept to the system of symbols that establish the minimum level of understanding the relations between states and implicitly, of the military forces associated with these states, and it is attributed to Alastair Johnson (1995:32-64).

was inherited and partially, it was culturally transmitted. Under these circumstances, namely those of the transition from collective organization toward the individual one, highlighted by numerous sociologists, the security culture needs a natural development, through a "natural" learning, first in a formal environment, and then, by extension, in the non-formal and informal environment of education, of manners of activating the symbolic power. The first step was made through the National Defense Strategy for 2015-2019. The second step, of the alignment of curricular documents with the strategic design and the development of the dimension named "security education" needs to be achieved. The invoked common effort does not produce effects in the state-citizens relationships. It is fundamental for the strategy to be followed by ways of imposing a development of security culture, through the common part of national curriculum, starting from the primary and pre-primary education, which is, starting from the age segment at which values, norms and attitudes are formed. In essence, this alignment does only represent the natural agreement between two types of cultures, the national one and the organizational one (of the core security and of education); out of whose convergence the *soft power* may emerge. In time, many specialists focused on this alignment. Suffice to remind Garrett Jones' (2009) *It's a cultural thing*, to bring up the possibility of activating the soft power through the organizational culture, as a future possible development of the current study.

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